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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, the barriers to re-employment for unemployed job seekers are studied by means of 
duration models. The determinants included in the duration models are derived from an economie model 
of the different stages in the job search process. The empirical analysis of unemployment duration is 
based on both a reduced form and a structural approach. 
The reduced form model used is a propottional hazard model with a flexible base-line hazard. In the 
estimation procedure, special attention is paid to the problems of unobserved heterogeneity and attrition 
bias. The estimation results showthat age and non-labour income have a significant negative impact on 
the re-employment probability of unemployed job seekers. In addition, the hazard rate appears to be 
negative duration dependent. 
In the structural model, the rate at which unemployed job seekers find a job is decomposed into the 
application rate and the probability of receiving an actual job offer if an application is made. We find that 
the low probability of becoming (re-)employed is mainly caused by the low probability to receive an 
actual offer. Furthermore, differences in the application intensity of unemployed job seekers can be 
explained by various personal characteristics, regional labour market conditions, elapsed duration of 
unemployment and search methods, whereas the outcome of the selection process is mainly influenced 
by the qualifications of unemployed job seekers. 

1. INTRODUCTION 
In many countries, including the Netherlands, the unemployment rate has been remarkably high 
during the eighties. The consequences of this persistently high level of unemployment are far-reaching 
for the Dutch economy in terms of productivity and welfare loss. On the individual level, unemployment 
influences the well-being not only as a result of reduced income, but also due to a loss of social 
contacts and of social status. 
The persistent nature of unemployment has become even more visible when the Dutch economy 
recovered f rom the recession in the second half of the eighties and employment started to grow steadily 
(with about 70.000 jobs per year). Many unemployed people, who are willing to work but were unable 
to benefit from the newly available jobs, find themselves excluded from this economie recovery. This 
exclusion might be tackled by effective labour market policies, provided it were known which causes 
prevent unemployed people from becoming re-employed. In other words, it is essential to identify the 
barriers to re-employment for unemployed job seekers in order to be able to improve the labour market 
prospects of these people. 
In this paper, barriers to re-employment for unemployed job seekers will be studied by means 
of duration models. We will use hazard models of unemployment duration in which the intensity at which 
unemployed people are leaving the state of unemployment (the hazard rate) is explained by relevant 
personal and labour market characteristics (for an overview of duration models with hazard functions, 
see Kiefer, 1988). Moreover, the models will ailow the hazard rate to vary over time in order to estimate 
the size and direction of duration dependence1. In general, two different methods can be foliowed to 
model unemployment duration, namely a "reduced form" and a structural approach. Both approaches 
will be used in this paper, whereas the specification of the models will be derived from job search theory. 
The structural model used in this paper does explicitly distinguish between the application behaviour of 
unemployed job seekers and the selection behaviour of employers in the allocation process on the 
labour market. Hence, the model differs from the structural model used up to now in empirical studies 
of unemployment duration (see Yoon, 1981, Lancaster and Chesher, 1983, Lynch, 1985, Narendranathan 
and Nickell, 1985, Ridder and Gorter, 1986, Wolpin, 1987 and Van den Berg, 1990). 
Furthermore, we will pay special attention to the spatial context of the job search process by 
incorporating the pressure of the local labour demand for different homogeneous groups (with respect 
to occupational group, age and gender) in the model. 
Finally, it is obvious that the policy implications are directly linked to the identification of the 
barriers for unemployed job seekers: removing such bottlenecks (or changing the (dis)-incentives) will 
lead to an improvement of the labour market prospects of unemployed job seekers. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we will derive the determinants of 
unemployment duration from a theoretical model of the different stages in the job search process. The 
data and variables used in the analysis will be considered in the next section. The reduced form and the 
structural model will be presented in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, we will draw some 
conciusions on the basis of our empirical results in section 6. 
2. ECONOMIC MODELS OF UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION 
In job search theory, the probability of getting a job for an unemployed job seeker is usually modelled 
as the product of the probability of getting a job offer and the probability of accepting this offer (for a 
survey of job search theory, see Mortensen, 1986). The spell of unemployment is considered to be an 
investment in achieving a higher wage in the future. Optimal search behaviour implies that the 
unemployed job seeker is trading off the cost of further search (including the "opportunity" cost of not 
accepting a job offer) against the discounted gain of possible future job offers with a higher wage level. 
The equality of marginal costs and benefits of job search gives rise to an unique solution for the so-
called reservation wage, i.e., the minimum wage level for which an unemployed individual will accept the 
job offer. In this context, the escape (or hazard) rate of unemployment can be written as 
The presence of duration dependence of unemployment (hysteresis) can also be examined on the macro 
level (see for example. Graaf land, 1988). 
1 
X -n . [1-F(w*)] 0) 
with 
A = hazard rate 
n = job offer arrival rate 
F(wJ = wage offer distribution 
w = reservation wage 
In a tight labour market, the level of the reservation wage is the crucial factor for the duration of 
unemployment. Under the assumption of optimal search, it can be derived that the reservation wage is 
correlated positively with the mean and variance of the distribution of expected wages and the level of 
unemployment benefits, and negatively with the discount factor and the direct search cost (Mortensen, 
1986). 
In a depressed labour market, however, unemployment duration is expected to be mainly 
determined by demand side factors, i.e., the probability of getting a job offer. In job search theory, the 
arrival of job offers is usually seen as an exogenous process (usually following a Poisson distribution), 
which cannot be influenced by the behaviour of both job seekers and employers. One could - in this 
view - say that the probability of receiving a job offer is the "chance" component of the probability of 
leaving the state of unemployment, whereas the probability of accepting a job offer is the "choice" 
component (see for example, Mortensen and Neumann, 1984). However, Narendranathan and Nickell 
(1985) already pointed out that the intensity of receiving job offers is the product of the rate at which 
potential jobs are discovered and the probability that a potential job is actually offered to the job seeker, 
given a job application. From this decomposition, it becomes clear that for an individual the arrival of 
job offers may be hampered by 
(I) the inability to discover potential jobs due to 
a) a lack of information about the potential jobs 
b) a shortage of available vacancies 
(II) an insufficiënt level of labour productfvity (as expected by the employer2) related to 
a) the qualifications required for the jobs 
b) the qualifications of other applicants 
The decomposition of Narendranathan and Nickell can be extended even further by distinguishing 
explicitly between the decision to apply (made by the job seeker) and the probability of receiving an 
actual job offer. 
Formally, one could rewrite the hazard rate of unemployment as 
A - * , . P , . P r . - [ l - F 0 O ] «. W 
with 
Md = intensity at which potential jobs are discovered 
Pa = probability of applying for a potential job (given that it is discovered) 
Pr = probability of receiving a job offer (given that one applied for it) 
Summarizing, we can distinguish four structural barriers to re-employment for unemployed job-
seekers3: 
(1) potential jobs cannot be found (pd) (2) no applications are made for discovered jobs (Pa) (3) the expected productivity is insufficiënt according to the employer (P^ 
(4) the actual job offer is not attractfve according to the applicant (1-F(w )) 
* It might also be the case that unemployed job searchers do not apply for a job, because they don't 
consider themsetves to be of sufficiënt quality ("negative self-selectivity"). 
3
 We note that this decomposition of the path to re-employment cannot be applied if jobs are offered 
di" reet ly to the job seeker. In our model, it is assumed that the unemployed job seeker is search ing 
sequentially for jobs until a suitable one is found and that the different stages in the job search 
procedure take place without any delay. 
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Now, the question arises as to how the effects of the structural barriers on the leaving rate of 
unemployment can be measured. One can choose between two different approaches: 
(a) estimating a structural model of unemployment duration in which the effect of each stage in the 
job search process (discovering a potential job, applying for a job, receiving a job offer and 
accepting an offer) can be identified, and 
(b) estimating a "reduced form" model of unemployment duration without disentangling the effects 
of the structural components. The structural elements in the several stages can, however, be 
used to select the appropriate determinants of finding a job in the "reduced form" model. 
Most of the empirical applications of unemployment duration models are based on the latter approach 
(see for studies in the Netherlands, for example Kooreman and Ridder, 1983, Van Opstal and Theeuwes, 
1986, Meesters and Van de Pol, 1989, Theeuwes et al., 1990 and Gorter et al., 1991), because there is 
usually no (or not reliable) data available which gives information about the various stages in the job 
search process. In order to estimate structural models, it is almost inevitable to differentiate between 
fewer stages. Until now (as far as we know), structural models of unemployment duration are formulated 
in which only two stages are distinguished, namely the arrival process of job offers and the acceptance 
probability of the job-seeker (i.e., formulation (1)). For the Netherlands, structural models - on the basis 
of optimal search behaviour - have been estimated by Ridder and Gorter (1986) and Van den Berg 
(1990). 
However, one can expect that in depressed (regional) labour markets the acceptance probability of 
an actual job offer is close to 14, so that the length of unemployment duration is mainly determined by 
the barriers in the job offer arrival process5. Therefore, we will here develop another decomposition of 
the hazard rate, which will be based on the application behaviour of the job seeker and the selection 
behaviour of the employer. The hazard rate is then written as 
with
 H - nö . Pa . [1-F(w*)l 
and 
na = the application rate of unemployed job seekers 
Pr = probability of receiving an actual job offer (given that one applied for it) 
This altemative specification of the structural model includes the employers' selectivity towards the 
applicant in contrast with the usual specification of the structural model. Furthermore, the "choice" 
component of the job seeker has been shifted from the last stage (i.e., accepting an actual offer) to the 
first stage (i.e., applying for a job). In fact, it is assumed that one knows the wage rate associated with 
a vacancy before one responds to that vacancy, i.e. before the job is actually offered. Consequently, the 
decision whether to apply for a vacancy or not is also determined by the wage corresponding to that 
vacancy. The probability of applying for a job then becomes 
P;-P«.[1-F(tO] (4) 
with 
1-F(w*) = probability of application based on the wage level of a job 
Pa = probability of application based on other characteristics of a job. 
The altemative specification of the structural model (see equation (3)) has the advantage that the 
effect of the selectfve choice behaviour of both job seekers and employers can be identified. It must be 
realized, however, that this specification still is a restrictive version of the full (four-stage) model6. 
This expectation is confirmed by the results of Van den Berg (1990), who coocluded that almost every 
job offer is acceptable for unemployed job searchers. 
5
 In this respect, another direction of relevant research is the acceptance and hiring strategy of 
employers trying to fill theïr vacancies (see for example. Van Ours, (1989, 1990)). 
6
 Notice that this is also true for the "usual" specification of the structural model. 
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Therefore, we will first proceed along the lines of the "reduced form" approach in which the path to 
re-employment is not specified and will return to the structural approach in the second part of this paper. 
The choice of the explanatory variables in the reduced form model can be obtained from the structural 
elements in each stage in the job search process (according to (2)). 
Staae 1: acquiring Information on potential jobs. 
The ability of the unemployed individual to find the available vacancies will depend on his search 
behaviour with respect to the kind of search channels (and the intensity at which they are used), the 
tightness of the relevant segment on the local/regional labour market (according to occupation, sector, 
age-group, educational level, etc.) and other personal characteristics (like for example the social 
environment). 
Staae 2: applying for a job. 
The probability that an unemployed worker will apply for a job will depend on the expected gain in 
income, the duration of unemployment (for example, negatively due to a "discouragement" effect and/or 
positively due to a "learning" effect) and other personal characteristics. 
Staae 3: receiving an actual job offer. 
The probability that the unemployed individual is actually chosen to fill the vacant job will depend on 
personal characteristics (such as age, nationality, education, gender, etc.) and the labour market history 
of the individual (occupation in a previous job, number of spells of (un)emplo -ment, the length of the 
current spell of unemployment, etc). In addition, the degree of competition for the type of job (i.e. the 
tightness of the market) will also play an important role. The degree of competition will depend (among 
others) on the kind of job applied for, the number of potential applicants and the way information - about 
which jobs are vacant - is gathered by the job seeker. 
Staae 4: accepting an actual job offer. 
The acceptance probability of the unemployed person will depend on the expected gain in (family) 
income, personal characteristics (like age, education, gender, househoid position, etc.) and the duration 
of unemployment. The latter is - according to search theory - expected to be (negatively) correlated with 
the ievel of the reservation wage. 
In conclusion, we arrive at the following scheme of the determinants of unemployment duration that 
play a role in the four stages of the job search process (see Figure 1). 
STAGES -
DETERMINANTS i 
(1) 
DISCOVERING 
AVACANCY 
(2) 
APPLYING 
FOR A JOB 
(3) 
RECEIVING 
AN OFFER 
(4) 
ACCEPTING 
AN OFFER 
SEARCH 
STRATEGY 
* 
-
* 
-
LABOUR 
DEMAND 
* 
-
* 
-
INCOME - * * * 
CURRENT 
DURATION 
-
* * * 
OTHER 
ATTRIBUTES 
* * * * 
Fiaure 1. The determinants of unemployment duration in the four stages of the job search process (an 
asterisk indicates an influence in the relevant stage). 
In the rest of this paper, we will estimate models of unemployment duration by incorporating (sets of) 
. sr 4 
variables refiecting the impact of the determinants in the model7. This enables us to determine whether 
the transition from unemployment to employment is prevented by the use of inefficiënt search activities, 
bad labour market conditions, insufficiënt financial incentfves, the high length of the elapsed duration 
of unemployment or unfavourable personal and labour market characteristics. 
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
The data used in our analysis originates from the labour market surveys conducted by the Dutch 
organisation for strategie labour market research, OSA ("Organisatie voor Strategisch 
Arbeidsmarktonderzoek"). The OSA labour market surveys are held in order to provide actual labour 
market information and do also offer the opportunity to analyze the behaviour of labour supply in more 
detail. The first stage took place in April 1985, when almost 3,000 indfviduals were interviewed about their 
current labour market position, their labour market history and numerous personal characteristics. In 
addition, people who reported to be searching for a Job were asked about their search behaviour. In the 
second stage of the labour market survey (held in November 1986), an attempt was made to re-interview 
the same people. From the original number of people in the first wave, roughly 35% was - for several 
reasons - not questioned again (see Allaart et al., 1989). 
For our analysis, we have selected the indh/iduals who were reported to be unemployed and were 
searching for a job in the first stage of the survey and who were also re-interviewed in the second stage 
and hence were able to provide information on the labour market events between the two stages. In this 
way, we were able to ident'rfy whether the unemployed job seeker nas succeeded to leave the state of 
unemployment or not. Furthermore, we have also information on the residual duration for the leavers 
of the unemployment state. 
The duration of unemployment of individuals at the first stage is measured by means of two 
variables, namely the duration of registration at the labour exchange and the answer to the question 
"how long have you been looking for work". The latter will be used in this paper, because the moment 
of registration at the labour exchange office does not necessarily coincide with the start of the period 
of unemployment8. 
The OSA labour market surveys were extended with data on unemployment rates in geographical 
occupational labour market segments. The geographical areas in the Netheriands were selected by 
extending each so-called Corop region with the adjacent Corop regions. For each of these areas 
unemployment rates have been calculated for 46 homogeneous occupational groups, 5 age groups and 
for maies and females separately (see for more details, Mekkelholt et al., 1989). These unemployment 
rates (cross-classified according to occupation, age and gender) can be used to reflect the condition 
of the regional labour market for each individual in the sample. 
Furthermore, we have supplemented this data set by adding information on the expected wage level. 
In the survey, the following question nas been asked. "If you compare yourself with other colleagues or 
with friends with a similar education as you have, what do you expect to earn in a full time job?". The 
answer to this question nas been used to evaluate the expected wage level. For unemployed people who 
did not answer this question, we have assessed the expected wage level on the basis of a set of 
personal characteristics (iike, age, education, gender, etc). For this purpose, we have used the results 
of a regression of the expected wage level of unemployed job seekers on personal characteristics 
estimated on the basis of an extended dataset by Groot and Jehoel-Gijsbers, (1990)9. The level of 
unemployment benefits is determined by taking together the revenues directly related to the state of 
unemployment of an individual. Other sources of income (such as labour market income of the partner, 
rent, interest, income from activities in the "black market", etc.) are added up in the variable additional 
income. 
The choice of these variables will be discussed in section 3. 
o 
In addition, there are unemployed people looking for a job uho are not registered at the labour 
exchange office. 
Q 
Note that the implementation of the estimated values of the expected wage level might introducé a 
selection bias if the group who answered the question about the expected wage level is different from the 
group who did not. 
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The information on personal characteristics, search behaviour and labour market history collected 
on the first stage have been used to choose the explanatory variables corresponding to each 
determinant of unemployment duration. With respect to the labour market history, two variables will be 
used in this paper. First, it is known how many years a person nas been employed until now (with 
exclusion of possible unemployment spells) and this figure is used as an indicator of work experience. 
Secondly, the individuals are asked about the changes in labour market position in the previous five 
years. This information is used to identify the number of transitions between unemployment and 
employment in this period (this variable will sometimes be abbreviated as "the number of U-E 
transitions"). Another important variable (especially in the structural model) inciuded in our analysis is 
the number of rejected applications made in the six months previous to the first stage of the survey. 
After eliminating observations with missing information, a sample of 162 individuals remained. In the 
appendix, we have given an overview of the independent variables and their sample means. 
4. A PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL WITH A FLEXIBLE BASE-UNE HAZARD 
4.1. The likelihood function 
In order to estimate the reduced form of equation (2), we must specify the hazard rate as a function of 
the explanatory variables and the current spell of unemployment duration. In this paper, we will use a 
flexible functional form for the base-line hazard in order to allow the hazard rate to vary over time and 
test whether there is any unobserved heterogeneity left in the model. Consequently, we will assume the 
following stepwise functional form for the hazard rate over time: 
X(t) - A | , f H < f sf, , y-1 n (5) 
so that the corresponding density function is given by 
i - i 
-^Mj-J -E^iCi - t i - i ) (6) 
f(t) - A, . e ^ 
We assume that the hazard rate is given by 
where X is the matrix of independent explanatory variables and a> and (3 are vectors of unknown 
parameters. 
As stated in section 3, the estimation wiil be carried out on the basis of a two-stage labour market 
survey. This implies that we have information on three types of unemployment duration spells: 
(1) Incomplete spells of unemployment duration for individuals who are unemployed both at the 
time of the first and the second survey; 
(2) a. Completed spells of unemployment duration with full information for individuals who are 
unemployed at the first inquiry and get a job (at a known date) between t in first and the second 
stage; and 
b. Completed spells of unemployment duration without full information for individuals who are 
unemployed at the first stage and get a job (at an unknown date) between the first and the 
second stage. 
Suppose that the elapsed duration of unemployment at the first stage is t1 (incomplete duration). Let the 
time between the first stage and the end of the unemployment spell be equal to t2 (residual duration) 
and let the time between the two stages of the survey be equal to ^ (see Figure 2). 
In our likelihood function, we will use both incomplete and residual duration with the joint probability 
function (see Ridder, 1984): 
6 
sr(M2) - £f(0 
(8) 
Consequently, the likelihoodfunction becomes 
n tl-f\M)] n f(t,+iz) 
spels of type 1 spete of type 2a 
n 
qpa& of type 2b 
[F(f,H)-F(t,)J 
MO (9) 
Now, the parameters of the model can be estimated by maximizing the likelihoodfunction. In the next 
section, we will discuss the estimation results. 
stage: 
n 
[ ] [2] 
I 
I-
-«1 • - - - - t 2 - - | 
% - - . . . | 
> time -> 
type of observation: 
(1) 0-
(2) a 0-
b 0-
Fiaure 2. Information on unemployment duration in the surveys. 
4.2. The estimation results 
First of all, we will present in Table 1 the results for the (sets of) determinants of unemployment duration 
in the proportional hazard model (w'rth the reference group of dummy variables in parentheses). 
It is noticeable that the relevant segment condition of the labour market with respect to the 
occupational and age group - as refiected by the unemployment rate - has a positive influence on the 
length of unemployment duration10. Apparently, local labour market conditions are responsibie for 
differences in unemployment duration, providing support for the hypothesis that individuals search for 
a job in a limited geographical area. 
The small - insignificant - positive effect of unemployment benefits levels on the hazard rate suggests 
that there is no "push"-effect on unemployment duration. This result is in line with the other empirical 
studies in the Netherlands (for example, see Van Opstal and Theeuwes, 1986, Lindeboom and 
Theeuwes, 1989, Gorter and Hoogteijling (1990), Groot and Jehoel-Gijsbers, 1990). The presence of 
additional income - mainly stemming f rom the labour-income of the partner - substantially increases the 
expected length of unemployment duration. It is possible that an individual who is independent (or less 
dependent) on labour income is more selective with respect to the type of job. The expected wage level 
turns out to have a small impact on the unemployed job seeker in obtaining a job more rapidly. A much 
stronger "pull" effect of the expected wage (i.e., the elasticity of expected duration becomes 0.7) is found 
by Groot and Jehoel-Gijsbers when they extend the OSA dataset with other data sources related to the 
years 1985-1986. 
We notice here that the differences in unemployment rates (cross-classified according to occupation, 
age, and gender) between adjacent areas are quite high in the Netherlands (up to 40-50%), which leads to 
differences in expected duration of about 25-30% (ceteris paribus). 
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variables: coëfficiënt t-value 
-0.004 -0.02 
0.032 0.18 
-0.058 -0.26 
* SEARCH STRATEGY 
- main search activity (informal contacts) 
. looking at advertisements 
. writing at advertisements 
. labour exchange office 
* LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS 
- regional unemployment rate [in %] -0.006 -1.12 
* INCOME INCENTIVES* 
- Iog[unemployment benefits] 
- log [additional income] 
- log [expected wage level] 
* DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT" 
- less than six months 
- between six and twelve months 
- more than one year 
* OTHER CHARACTERISTICS 
- age [in years] 
- educational level [1 =primary;...; 5=high] 
- preference for full-time job (part-time) 
- willing to move (unwilling) 
- household position (single male) 
. single woman 
. man with partner 
. woman with partner 
- experience [in years] 
- number of U-E transitions 
- number of applications 
minus loa-likelihood 
number of observations 
Table 1. Estimation results of the proportional hazard model 
(*: measured in guilders per month, **: fiexible baseline hazard). 
From the estimates of the step function for the base-line hazard, we conclude that the duration of 
unemployment is negative duration dependent, which means that the probability of getting a job 
decreases over time. The reduction of the hazard rate does already occur in the first year of 
unemployment and is stable afterwards11. 
The variables measuring differences in personal and labour market characteristics demonstrate that 
only age nas a significant effect on the probability of finding a job. Each additional year is responsible 
for an increase of 3.2% in the expected duration of unemployment. Similar results have been found by 
Gorter and Hoogteijling (1990) who used data of unemployed job searchers originating from the Dutch 
Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1985-1987. Furthermore, Kerckhoffs et al. (1990) also estimated that 
each additional year for unemployed males (registered at the labour exchange office in April 1987) gfves 
rise to an increase of about 2.5% on expected unemployment duration. 
0.009 0.57 
-0.036 -2.21 
0.045 0.22 
2.091 -1.38 
-2.235 -1.49 
-2.582 -1.73 
-0.032 -2.88 
0.022 0.36 
0.049 0.24 
-0.097 -0.71 
0.160 0.71 
0.257 1.20 
0.412 1.58 
0.012 0.99 
0.084 0.87 
0.001 0.17 
920.04 
162 
It appeared that the variation in the base-line hazard after the first year of unemployment was 
negligible (see also Appendix B). 
8 
Surprisingly, people with higher education have only slightly better chances of getting a job than 
lowly educated people. Studies of unemployment duration usually show a significant positive effect of 
the educational level on the hazard rate (see tor example, Groot and Jehoel-Gijbers (1990), Kerckhofs 
et al. (1990), Gorter et al. (1990) and Van Opstal and Theeuwes (1986)). In our model, education is 
measured in a uni-dimensional way, which might be too rigid to identtfy the expected advantage of a 
higher educational level. 
In summary, we conclude from our estimates that the major determinants of unemployment duration 
appear to be age, additional income and elapsed duration. This is nicely corresponding with the results 
of Vissers and Groot (1988), who have analyzed differences in unemployment duration by means of 
probit models on the basis of the same data source. Moreover, the significant negative effect of age on 
the hazard rate is universally found in Dutch studies of search duration using similar data on (registered) 
unemployed job seekers (see Table 2). We can also observe from Table 2 that the duration of 
unemployment usually nas a significant negative effect on the hazard rate. Unfortunately, it is imposssibie 
to compare our results of an substantial effect of additional income on unemployment duration because 
this variable is usually not included in other Dutch studies. 
Study Data Effect of Age Effect of Duration 
Gorter and 
Hoogteijling (1990) 
Unemployed 
1985-1987 
sign. negative not included (partial 
likelihood estimates) 
Gorter et al. (1990) Registered Unemployed 
Males, Nov. 1988 
sign. negative sign. negative (due to 
unobserved heterogeneity) 
Groot and 
Jehoel-Gijsbers (1990) 
Unemployed 
1985-1986 
sign. negative sign. negative (due to 
elapsed duration) 
Kerckhoffs et al. (1990) Registered Unemployed 
Males, April 1987 
sign. negative sign. pos. (first 200 days) 
sign. neg. (afterwards) 
Lindeboom and 
Theeuwes (1991) 
Unemployed with 
Unemployment Benefits 
1982-1984 
sign. negative sign. negative12 
Theeuwes et al. (1990) Unemployed 
1980-1985 
- Males 
- Females 
sign. negative 
not sign. 
not sign. 
not sign. 
Table 2. The effect of age and duration on the hazard rate: An overview of Dutch studies 
Finally, we have checked whether our estimates were biased due to the effect of attrition and 
unobserved heterogeneity. The specification tests showed that these effects are not significantly present 
in our model (see, for more details, Appendix B). 
5. A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION 
In this section, we will estimate a structural model in which the hazard rate is decomposed into the 
application rate and the probability of receiving an actual job offer (see also equation (3) in section 
2) . This model can be estimated by using information on unemployment duration and the number 
It should, however, be noted that there is a significant positive effect found for the residual 
duration of entitlement to (higher levels of) unemployment benefits. 
An analogous approach for a structural model of vacancy duration is used by Van Ours (1990a). In 
this model the hazard rate is split up into the product of the rate at which applicants arrive and the 
probability a random applicant is accepted by the employer. 
9 
of rejected applications during the elapsed period of unemployment. We will assume that the number 
of rejected applications follows a Poisson process with parameter na. In our data set, we only have 
information on the number of rejected applications made in the six months previous to the first stage 
of the survey. In that case, the conditional probability density function for the number of applications ( 
h(k|t1)) becomes: 
( f Ma(s).(1-P r(s))cfe)k . ƒ ,a(s).(i-Pr(s))ds (10) 
h{k\ ij - m a X ( 6 , t l ' 6 ) . x e « ' « ^ i - " 
with k the number of rejected applications made in the six months previous to the first stage of the 
survey14. 
The information on unemployment duration will again be used in the joint probability density function 
of residual and incomplete duration (see equation (8) in section 4.1), but now we have: 
t i + t 2 
" f Ma(s)Pr(s)dS (11) 
Htvh) - ^( ' i+fe^rd+fe) • e 
In order to derive the joint probability density function of unemployment duration (t^tg) and the number 
of applications k during the first phase of unemployment, we will use the following assumption: 
h(k\t,)-h,(k\tt,t2) (12) 
which means that the number of applications (conditional on t,) is independent of the residual duration 
of unemployment. The joint probability density function of (tlFt2) and k can now be factorized as: 
h*(tvt2,k) -h(k\t,).g(tvt2) (13) 
which will be used in our likelihood function. 
For the choice of the determinants of the application rate 0*a) and the probability of receiving an 
actual job offer (Pr), we will use the structure from Figure 1. Combining the first two stages from Figure 
1 implies that each determinant should be included in the specification of the application rate and the 
probability of receiving an actual job offer. 
Hence, we will specify: 
i , 
„ a ( f ) - e a J ( t ) + 2 ^ 
e«j2(t)*Z272 04) 
1 + e a J ( t ) + Z 2 7 2 
with Z, and Z2 matrices of the relevant independent explanatory variables, 
7 t and 72 vectors of unknown parameters and aj1(t) and oj2(t) vectors of the unknown interval dummies; 
j=interval: 0-6 months, 6-12 months, over 12 months. 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters are presented in Table 3. 
In this model, it is assumed that unemptoyed job searchers know the wage rate associated with a 
vacancy before they respond to that vacancy and that they wilt only respond if the wage rate is higher than 
the reservation wage. 
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application rate 
variables: 
coëfficiënt 
* SEARCH STRATEGY 
- main search actfvity (informal contacts) 
. looking at advertisements -0.338 
. writing at advertisements 0.168 
. labour exchange office -1.223 
ï job offer probability 
t-value coëfficiënt t-value 
-3.61 0.388 1.76 
2.09 -0.145 -0.72 
-9.15 1.281 4.82 
-0.007 -2.67 -0.001 -0.18 
* LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS 
- unemployment rate [in %] 
* INCOME INCENTIVES 
- log [unemployment benefits] 
- log[additional income] 
- logjexpected wage level] 
* DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
- less than six months 
- between six and twelve months 
- more than one year 
* OTHER CHARACTERISTICS 
- age [in years] 
- educ. level [1 = primary;..., 5=high] 
- willing to move (unwilling) 
- preference for full-time job (part-time) 
household position (single male) 
. single woman 
. man with partner 
. woman with partner 
- experience [in years] 
- number of U-E transitions 
minus loa-likelihood 
number of observations 
Table 3. Estimation results for the structural model. 
It can be observed that the application rate is positfvely influenced by the expected wage level (pull-
effect), the number of labour market transitions in the past, "active" search behaviour (i.e., mainly writing 
on advertisements) and the preference for a full time job. On the other hand, there are unfavourable 
effeots on the application rate from "passive" search behaviour (mainly using the labour exchange office 
or - to some less extent - mainly looking at advertisements), the local unemployment rate (cross-
classified according to occupation, age and gender), the age, and the level of education of the 
unemployed job seeker. Furthermore, it becomes clear that female job seekers apply more frequently 
than single males, but less than males with a partner. The application rate appears to be negative 
duration dependent. 
The probability of receiving an actual job offer as a result of an application is remarkably lower for 
people who prefer full-time jobs. Males with a partner appear to have a significantly lower probability than 
single males of obtaining a job when applying. Furthermore, we find a negative effect of additional 
income on the offer probability. Our results also show that employers are selecting applicants on the 
basis of the level of education and (to a lower extent) age and experience. Surprisingly, the offer 
probability is relatively low in the first period of unemployment, rising in the second half year and 
decreasing again after one year. -
0.006 1.19 -0.003 -0.25 
-0.002 -0.43 -0.019 -1.45 
0.262 2.58 -0.203 -0.86 
-1.081 -1.55 -1.038 -0.61 
-1.493 -2.09 -0.597 -0.34 
-1.629 -2.31 -0.911 -0.53 
-0.025 -4.59 -0.012 -0.95 
-0.083 -3.21 0.113 1.67 
0.031 0.48 -0.141 -0.92 
0.841 7.09 -0.749 -3.09 
0.485 4.52 -0.314 -1.28 
0.601 6.28 -0.539 -2.27 
0.433 3.41 -0.189 -0.65 
0.006 1.20 0.013 0.92 
0.134 3.25 -0.040 
1872.6 
162 
-0.40 
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Next, we wiil present an interpretation of the most important results of the structural model, 
concerning the behaviour of both parties in the job search process. 
First, "passh/e" unemployed job seekers (i.e. people who report that their main search actfvity involves 
the assistance of the labour exchange office) apply significantiy less than "actfve" job seekers (i.e. people 
who report that their main search actfvity is writing on advertisements). The probability to receive a job 
offer (if an application is made) is, however, remarkably higher for the passfve group than for the active 
group of unemployed job seekers. Unfortunately, we do not have information about the search medium 
through which an application is made (using an advertisement, an informal contact or the labour 
exchange office), but it can be assumed that this medium will be the main search channel of the 
unemployed job seeker15. In that case, the parameter estimates of the search channels at the 
probability of receiving an offer imply that applications for vacancies counselied by the labour exchange 
office are relatively more successful than applications made by means of using advertisements. This 
finding might be a result of differences in the degree of competition. Advertisements usually attract a 
large pool of applications, whereas the labour exchange office tries to match an indfvidual job seeker with 
a particular vacant job. Next, suppose we assume that people who report that they mainly search by 
means of advertisements (looking or writing) are also making application through this channel. In that 
case, it can be concluded that those who report mainly looking at advertisements have a higher 
probability of obtalning a job if *hey apply than those who report mainly writing. This result indicates that 
unemployed people who report to be mainly writing try to escape from unemployment by applying to 
almost every relevant vacancy that they discover, whereas those who are mainly looking apply only for 
a job if they believe that there is a "real" chance of obtaining that job. 
Secondly, local labour market conditions (unemployment rate, expected wage leve!) have a significant 
influence on the intensity at which unemployed people apply, but have no impact on the probability that 
a job is offered if an application is made. Apparently, the (local) availability of (attractive) jobs is a more 
critica! determinant of the re-employment probability of unemployed job seekers than the degree of 
competition for vacant jobs. Surprisingly, additional income nas a negative effect on the offer probability 
and hardly influences the application rate. This might be due to the fact that people who are less 
dependent on labour income apply more selectively with respect to the characteristics of the job (but 
apply as frequent as other people). Thirdly, people with a higher level of education appear to apply less 
(i.e., in a more selective sense) than lower educated individuals, but their chances to obtain a job once 
they apply are significantiy higher (note that in the proportional hazard model there was no effect of 
education on the hazard rate). Fourthly, unemployed job seekers - who prefer full time jobs - apply more 
frequently, probably because working full time is provkJing a higher labour income. On the other hand, 
the probability of obtaining a job for unemployed job seekers who prefer full-time jobs (in stead of part-
time jobs) is relatively small. If unemployed job seekers apply according to their preferences, the lower 
probability to obtain a full-time job may originate from the higher supply of applicants. The higher degree 
of competition offers the employer an opportunity to be more selective and consequently it is harder to 
be chosen to fill a full time job than a part time job16. Frfthly, males with a partner apply more often 
than single males, but if an application is made they have a relatively small probability to be chosen by 
the employer to fill the vacant job. 
Finally, we consider the outcome with respect to the time dependence of the application rate and 
the offer probability - for a Standard indfvidual - simultaneously (see also Figure 3). 
Of course, applications can also be made by means of search channels other than the main one. 
Nevertheless, it is expected that there is a positive correlation betueen the main search channel and the 
medium through which the successful application is actually made. 
16
 In fact, it is unknown whether the job applied for is a full-time or part-time job. Only if people 
apply strictly according to their preferences, it is possible to relate the lower probability for people 
who prefer full-time jobs to receive a job offer (if an application is made) to the higher competition for 
full-time jobs. 
The hazard of a Standard individual is computed by evaluating all explanatory variables in their 
sample means. 
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Fiaure 3. Decomposition of the hazard rate for a Standard individual 
into the application rate (x 10"2) and the offer probability. 
It can be seen from the decomposition that the low level of the hazard rate is a result of the low 
probability to receive an actual job offer. During the first period of unemployrnent (less than six months 
unemployed), job seekers apply more frequently than after this period but the probability to obtain an 
actual offer is low. A plausible explanation for this phenomenon is the following. The unemployed, 
although actively seeking, do not yet know which type of job is suitable for them or for which job they 
have a "real" chance and therefore they are often rejected by the employer. After the first period of 
unemployrnent, people may have learned from their experiences and adopt a more selective application 
strategy for the next period. This may then result in a higher probability of obtaining ajob in the second 
period of unemployrnent. In the remaining period of unemployrnent (over one year10), the application 
rate does not decrease much further but the offer probability falis back again. The latter phenomenon 
could be due to an increasing selectivity for unemployed people with a longer duration. 
To summarize, the alternative decomposition of the hazard rate - emphasizing the importance of 
different stages in the job offer arrtval process - nas provided a number of interesting conclusions. It has 
been possible to shed light on the determinants of the application behaviour of the unemployed job 
seeker as well as the selection behaviour of the employer19. Nevertheless, we wish to repeat our 
remark made in section 2. This type of model is a restrictfve version of the full (four-stage) model. We 
believe that it could be a promising direction for further empirical research to extend our model with the 
identification of the "reservation wage" strategy of the unemployed job seeker. 
18 It is hard to obtain reliable statistical results for the time dependence of the application rate 
after one year, because the number of observations in the different time periods becomes too low. 
However, it should be realized that the model is estimated on the basis of a limited number of 
observations. 
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Finally, we will compare the estimation results of the structural and the reduced form model by 
looking at the derivatives of the logarithm of the hazard rate with respect to the independent variables. 
In the case of the reduced form model, this derivative is simply equal to the estimated coëfficiënt (6) of 
the relevant variable, whereas for the structural model it can be derived that 
^ " 711 • 7 a - P^i (15) 
In the latter case, we need to choose certain values of the expianatory variables to calculate the 
probability of receh/ing an offer (P,)20. Here, the value of Pr is computed by evaluating the expianatory 
variables in their sample means. The results of the derivatives for both models are presented in Table 4. 
reduced form model structural model 
* SEARCH STRATEGY 
- main search activity (informal contacts) 
. looking at advertisements -0.004 0.035 
. writing at advertisements 0.032 0.029 
. labour exchangt office -0.058 0.008 
* LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS 
- unemployment rate [in %] -0.006 -0.008 
* INCOME INCENTIVES 
- logfunemployment benefits] 
- logfadditional income] 
- log[expected wage level] 
* OTHER CHARACTERISTICS 
- age [in years] 
- educational level [1 =primary;...; 5=high] 
- willing to move (unwilling) 
- preference for full-time job (part-time) 
household position (single male) 
. single woman 
. man with partner 
. woman with partner 
- experience [in years] 
- number of U-E transitions 
Table 4. Derivatives of the logarithm of the hazard rate with respect to the expianatory variables for the 
reduced form and structural model. 
In general, we can observe that the outcomes for the structural model are in lino with the findings of the 
reduced form model. If we compare the derivatives of the (logarithm of) the hazard with respect to the 
most significant variables in the reduced form model (age, additional income, household position and 
local unemployment rate, respectively), it can be seen that the impact of age and the local 
unemployment rate are roughly the same, whereas larger differences are found for the effect of additional 
income and the household position of the individual. More specifically, the elasticity of the hazard with 
respect to additional income is substantially smaller in the structural model and the positive effect of 
having a partner is less pronounced in the structural model. 
In short, a comparison of both models shows that - at most variables -the total effects on the hazard 
rate for the structural model roughly correspond to the effects resulting from the reduced form model. 
0.009 0.003 
-0.036 -0.020 
0.045 0.067 
-0.032 -0.036 
0.022 0.026 
-0.097 -0.104 
0.049 0.121 
0.160 0.183 
0.257 0.082 
0.412 0.251 
0.012 0.018 
0.084 0.096 
A sensitivity analysis is needed to find out to which extent the derivatives depend on the values 
of the expianatory variables chosen. 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have tried to identify the barriers to re-employment for unemployed job seekers by 
estimating duration models. The determinants included in the duration models are derived from a 
theoretical model of the different stages in the job search process. Two types of models have been used 
in the paper. 
First, we have estimated a proportional hazard model - with a flexible baseline hazard - in which the 
path to re-employment is not specified. This implies that it is not possible to distinguish between the 
underiying causes originating from the relevant stages of the process. The estimation results of the 
proportional hazard model show that it is relatively difficult to escape from unemployment for people who 
are older and/or already unemployed for a long time. Unemployed individuals who are not (or less) 
dependent on labour income also leave the state of unemployment less frequently. Furthermore, bad 
local labour market conditions on specific segments of the market are also responsible for a substantial 
increase in the expected duration of unemployment. It appears that in the proportional hazard model the 
level of unemployment benefits does not influence unemployment duration positively, which supports the 
conclusion of Groot and Jehoel-Gijsbers that there is no empirical evidence of a "push" effect of 
unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment in the Netherlands (within the current system 
of social security). 
Secondly, we have introduced a structural model of unemployment duration in which the hazard rate 
is decomposed into the application rate and the probability of receiving an actual job offer. The latter 
component reflects the "selection mechanism" controlled by the employer, whereas the former 
component is assumed to capture the choice behaviour of unemployed job seekers. From the estimation 
results, it becomes clear that the low level of the hazard rate is mainly caused by the low probability of 
receiving an actual job offer. The application intensity is significantly higher for younger people, people 
with a lower education, individuals who report to be searching mainly by means of advertisements and 
those who have experienced several transitions between unemployment and employment in the past. 
Higher expected wages and lower (segment-specific) unemployment rates also give rise to a higher 
application rate. Moreover, it appears that the short-term unemployed apply more frequently than the 
long-term unemployed. 
Nevertheless, more applications for a job do not guarantee that a job is obtained, which is due to 
the selective choice behaviour of the employer. The expected level of labour productivity of the 
unemployed applicant appears to be insufficiently related to the qualifications required for the job or the 
qualifications of other applicants (competition). Our estimates demonstrate that employers prefer 
younger, higher educated and more experienced individuals. In addition, chances for unemployed job 
seekers who prefer f uil-time jobs and male unemployed job seekers with a partner are significantly lower. 
The policy implications of the results of our structural model are the following. The intensity with 
which unemployed job seekers apply for a job may be improved for particular groups of unemployed 
(especially long-term unemployed people, single males, older people and seekers who report to be 
mainly searching with the assistance of the labour exchange office). Moreover, policies may also aim to 
enlarge the number of the potential job opportunities in regions which are characterized by high 
unemployment rates. 
On the other hand, it is important to give sufficiënt attention to irtcreasing the probability of obtaining 
a job if an application is made in order to improve the labour market prospects of unemployed job 
seekers. In particular, the qualifications of unemployed job seekers (notably education and work 
experience) should be tuned to the job requirements imposed by employers. This tuning process could 
be coordinated by local Labour Exchange Offices (for example, by means of the so-called method of 
Individual Traject Counseling ("Individuele Trajectbegeleiding")). 
Finally, we conclude that the results of the structural model used in this paper are promising, because 
they show that it is possible to get more insight into the arrival process of job offers. The model might 
be improved by explicitly including the "reservation wage" strategy of unemployed job seekers and the 
process of information gathering about vacant jobs. Such extensions wouid be a fruitful direction of 
further research. 
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APPENDIX A 
In this Appendix, we present the sample means of the variables used in the analysis and the distribution 
of the dependent variable (unemployment duration) over the different types of duration spells. 
Means of variables used in the analvsis (measured at the first stage of the Iabour market survey). 
SEARCH STRATEGY 
- main search activity 
. inforrnal contacts 
. looking at advertisements 
. writing at advertisements 
. Iabour exchange office 
REGIONAL LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS 
- unemployment rate (age-occupation-gender specific) 
21% 
27% 
35% 
17% 
18.6% 
INCOME INCENTIVES 
- unemployment benefits 
- additional income 
- expected wage ievel 
712 guilders per month 
1034 guilders per month 
1810 guilders per month 
OTHER INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS 
-age 36.0 years 
- educational Ievel 
(1=primary; 2= low vacational; 3= secondary; 
4=extended vocational; 5=university/high vocational) 3.3 
- willing to move (unwilling) 48% (52%) 
- preference for full-time job (part-time) 72% (28%) 
- household position 
. single male 18% 
. single woman 19% 
. man with partner 35% 
. woman with partner 28% 
- experience 11.8 years 
- number of transitions between unemployment 
and employed in previous five years 0.20 
UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION 
- elapsed duration of unemployment 20.3 months 
Distribution of unemplovment duration 
over the different types of duratün spells. 
number of incompleted spells 
number of completed spells (precise information) 
number of completed spells (imprecise information) 
87 
61 
14 
- total sample 162 
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APPENDIX B 
In this Appendix, we will first investigate the possible effect of attrition in our data set and secondly we 
will test for misspecification of the proportional hazard model (see section 4) due to unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
The proportional hazard model is estimated on the basis of data from two waves of a panel survey 
in 1985 and 1986. As mentioned in section 3, approximately 35% of the original 1985 sample was lost 
in the second wave. The use of panel data might lead to biased parameter estimates tf attrition is based 
on the endogenous variable of the model (unemployment duration) or if it depends on omitted variables 
correlated with the endogenous variable (see for example, Ridder 1990). We will check for the possible 
effect of attrition In our model by means of the foilowing simple tests. 
First, it is noted that the attrition loss for people in labour market states other than unemployment 
(employment or non-participation) is about the same as for unemployed people (see also Lindeboom 
and Theeuwes, 1990). 
Secondly, we consider the sample statistics (mean and Standard error) of elapsed duration of 
unemployment - in the first wave - for people who are reinterviewed and for those who don't appear for 
the second interview. The differences between both groups are negligible (see Table 2). 
All this leads us to the conclusion that there are no indications of an attrition bias in our model. 
unemployment duration (in months) 
•ean Standard error 
"stayers" 20.3 18.3 
"drop-outs" 19.4 18.8 
Table B1. Sample statistics of unemployment duration for "stayers" and "drop-outs" in the panel survey. 
In our model, the variation of the hazard rate over time is captured by the flexible base-line hazard. 
In the final specification of the model, the base-line hazard is constant after the first year, because 
allowing the hazard rate to vary over more time periods did not improve the fit of the model, whereas 
the additional duration parameters hardly differed from each other after the first year. In addition, the 
number of observations appeared to be too small to improve the "fit" of the model by allowing the hazard 
rate to change each month during the first year21. 
Next, we will test whether the parameter estimates are biased due to the effect of unobserved (inter-
individual) heterogeneity. In duration models, uncontrolled heterogeneity might bias the parameter 
estimates of the explanatory variables. In addition, the hazard may be biased towards negative duration 
dependence (see for example, Lancaster and Nickell, 1980). However, it is argued by Ridder (1987b) that 
the bias in the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in the proportional hazard model is 
negligible if one nas a sufficiently flexible baseline hazard. 
In order to test whether our results are biased by the effect of uncontrolled heterogeneity, we will use 
a score test (foilowing the approach of Lancaster, 1985). It is assumed that the unobserved heterogeneity 
is represented by a multiplicative error term v with mean 1 and variance o2. 
The hazard rate can then be written as 
\{t\v) - A(f) . v <B1) 
Next, the unconditional survivor function is expanded about the mean of v to second order, so that a 
score test of a2=0 can be evaluated without assuming a specific distribution function for v (see for more 
details Lancaster, 1985). The score test statistic is distributed asymptotically as a chi-squared variate with 
one degree of freedom and can be computed by using second derivatives of the likelihood function. 
Our proportional hazard model produces a chi-square statistic of 2.242 (the 10% significance ievel 
critical point is 2.710), so that the hypothesis of zero variance is not rejected. In other words, the effect 
of neglected heterogeneity is not significantly present in our reduced form model. 
In this respect, it should be noted that empirical studies of unemployment duration using conti nous 
hazard functions usually show a steadily decreasing hazard rate during the first period (see for example, 
Gorter et al., 1991). 
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